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Abstract 
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the thesis is a survey on 
intrusion steps and current intrusion detection technologies. There are three major 
steps in launching an intrusion. The first step is to gather informations from the 
target system. Then try to launch an actual attack. Finally is to cover or delete 
all the evidents left. For the intrusion detection systems, they can be divided into 
three parts, the data collection, the data analysis and the intrusion response. Some 
problems in the current intrusion detection systems are also discussed. 
The second part of the thesis is a purposed intrusion detection model with preemp-
tive functionality. Distributed intrusion detection systems have many advantages over 
their centralized counterparts such as scalability, subversion resistance, and graceful 
service degradation. However, an important disadvantage is their inability to block 
packets immediately when an intrusion is detected. To tackle this problem, a network-
based preemptive distributed intrusion detection system using mobile agents is pur-
posed. Packets are diverted to various types of agents strategically placed over the 
network. Various agents perform tasks in control, detection, policy, and blocking. 
Suspect packets are blocked before they reach the destination when an intrusion is 
detected and the policy verdicts for blockage. Ways to mitigate negative impacts of 
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Imagine you are a manager of a store. On the one hand you need to provide goods and 
services to your customers. One the other hand, you also need to protect your shop 
from different threats. People may steal goods from your shop; People may break into 
your shop at night; People with arms may threat you to give them money. All kinds 
of threats can happen. What you can do is to put up some security systems to protect 
your shop. 
You can have various options. You can install a CCTV system to record daily 
operations in your shop. Whenever you find something abnormal, you can search the 
tapes for clues. You can install some alarm systems to check if any customers steal 
goods. You can install a motion detector to detect anything occurred when the shop is 
closed. When the installed system detects a possible threat, actions have to be taken. 
The actions can be taken by the system itself. Or the system notifies people, such 
as you, your shopkeepers or the police, etc, to take actions. Possible actions include 
catching the stealer on the spot, sounding alarms to make robbers flee, etc. 
In the computer world, the situation is the same. You, as a staff of a company or 
as an individual, have to protect your computers from threats in the Internet. The 
intrusion detection system {IDS) is one of the tools to provide such protection. IDS 
can have various detectors around your network to detect possible attacks. Once 
possible attacks is found, the system can try to cut the connection or notify you for 
further actions. 
1.1 The Trends 
The threat of intrusion is growing rapidly these years. From figure 1.1, the growth of 
incidents reported by the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC)^ in 2001 is more 
iCERT/CC is funded by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to coor-
dinate communication among experts during security emergencies. It is now a major reporting center 
for Internet security problems. Its website is http://www.cert .org 
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Figure 1.1: Number of incidents reported from 1989-2002 by CERT Coordination 
Center 
than 2 folds than that in 2000 [2]. From figure 1.2, vulnerabilities reported are also 
raised rapidly. 
You can notice that the increase is very very fast in these 2 to 3 years. Although 
from a recent survey [3], managers have been continuously increasing the amount of 
money invested on the information security, the growth on intrusion incidents seems 
still continues. 
One of the reasons for the incidents growth may due to the system administrators 
tend to ignore software patches [4]. Many attacks can be successful because there 
are security holes in the software installed on the system. When the software become 
more and more complex, software faults are more likely to occur. When the software 
bugs are discovered, either by the producer or by the users, the software "fixes" would 
be released to fill the holes. However, many administrators tend to ignore the software 
patches, leaving the holes open wide for attacks. 
One of the major security incidents in 2001 is the spread of the “ Code Red" 
worm [5]. The reason why the “ Code Red" worm spread so rapidly is mainly due to 
system administrators tend to ignore software patches. In July 2001, the “ Code Red" 
worm spread through out the network. There are more than 350,000 servers infected 
at the peak time [6]. The worm explores the vulnerability of Microsoft's Internet 
Information Server [7]. However, Microsoft had discovered the bug one month ago 
before the outbreak and released the patches immediately afterward. Therefore, it is 
believed that the wide spread of the worm is due to administrators do not patch the 
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Figure 1.2: Vulnerabilities reported from 1995-2002 by CERT Coordination Center 
software regularly [6 . 
Another reason for the growth of incidents may due to the more and more sophis-
ticated intrusion tools available in the Internet [1]. Intruders no longer need to be 
system experts these days (see figure 1.3). Many of them don't have high level of ex-
pertise. They may just know where to download the intrusion tools and then execute 
them. That is it. They may even do not know what is going on when they execute 
the tools. This kind of people is sometimes refer to as lamers or script kiddies [8 . 
For those experienced intruders, the Internet is a nice place to exchange vulnerability 
informations. Whenever there are new vulnerabilities discovered, intruders can eas-
ily and quickly get the necessary informations, such as how to reproduce the attack 
scenarios. With the necessary informations, intruders can easily launch an attack or 
produce automated attack tools. 
1.2 What this Thesis Contains 
This thesis focuses on the current intrusion detection,technologies. The thesis is 
organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 is the background information of the intrusion detection system. The 
need of intrusion detection system and different categorization methods are included. 
Chapter 3 is a survey on the threats to the computer systems. Before we know how 
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Figure 1.3: Attack Sophistication VS. Intruder Technical Knowledge (from [1]) 
to protect our computer systems, we must first know how attackers launch attacks. 
The survey is on how an attacker normally does when launching an attack. 
Chapter 4 is a survey on the intrusion detection systems. The survey is on how an 
intrusion detection system collects and analysis data. It also includes the difficulties 
encountered in designing an intrusion detection system. 
Chapter 5 is a description on the purposed preemptive distributed intrusion de-
tection system architecture. This architecture makes use of both static and mobile 
agents to detect intrusion. The preemptive nature of the system makes it able to 
discard suspected packets immediately. 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion. 
There is a publication derived from this thesis. The paper "Preemptive Distributed 




The concept of intrusion detection was first raised about 20 years ago by James 
Anderson[9]. In the early 1980，James Anderson published his paper, Computer Se-
curity Threats Monitoring and Surveillance. His paper describes different categories 
of threats to the computer systems and how to detect those threats. The notion of 
intrusion detection was born at that time. 
2.1 Computer Security 
Intrusions and computer securities are closely related. An intrusion is to break the 
computer security in a system. Therefore, before we go on to talk about the intrusion 
detection system, we have to first define the meaning of computer security. The term 
"computer security" is commonly defined by three aspects: confidentiality, integrity 
and availability [10 . 
Confidentiality is defined as "the prevention of the unauthorized disclosure of in-
formation" . I t means to keep the information secret from other parties unless 
with your permission. For example, you would want to keep your credit card 
information secret from other people. 
Confidentiality can be broken in various way. Here we just show an example for 
illustration. When you send a file in plaintext, the intruders can easily see the 
information inside that file during transmission. Then the confidentiality of the 
information is broken. This technique is known as sniffing (see section 3.2.2). 
Integrity is defined as "the prevention of the unauthorized modification of informa-
tion" . I t means to keep the information original. Sometimes, it is not necessary 
to keep the information secret. But it is necessary to protect it from being 
"tainted". For example, you have setup an home page and welcome all people 
around the world to take a look. However, you would not want your home page 
being modified by others. 
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Integrity can be broken in various way. Here we just show an example for 
illustration. When you send a file to another party, the file may be intercepted 
by an attacker. The attacker then send a modified copy of that file to the party 
you intended to communicate. Then the integrity of the information is broken. 
This technique is known as session hijacking (see section 3.3.5) 
Availability is defined as "the prevention of the unauthorized withholding of infor-
mation or resources". It means the information should be obtainable whenever 
it is needed. Even if you can keep the “ confidentiality" and “ integrity" of the 
information, there is no use if you cannot get access to it. For example, you have 
a highly secure email server and all the data inside are encrypted. However, it 
is no use if your server always down. 
Availability can be broken in various way. Here we just show an example for 
illustration. Imagine that you have setup a server for people around the world to 
use. However, an attacker sends a lot of junk requests to the server. The server 
then run out of resources to serve other legitimate users. Then the availability 
of the information is broken. This technique is known as the denial-of-service 
attack (see section 3.3.1). 
If your computer has been broken into by an attacker, none of the above computer 
security aspects can be kept. Therefore, anti-intrusion techniques and computer se-
curities are closely related. 
2.2 Anti-intrusion Techniques 
There are various approaches to prevent intrusions [11], including prevention, preemp-
tion, deterrence, deflection, detection and countermeasures. 
Prevention means "precluding or severely handicapping likelihood of a particular 
intrusion's success". For example, applying systems patches regularly can suc-
cessfully close many security holes. However, this approach can successfully 
block some intrusions but not all. The software implementation of systems can 
not be bug-free, especially in a complex system [8]. With bugs in the system, 
intrusions are difficult to prevent. 
Preemption means "striking offensively against likely threat agents prior to an in-
trusion attempt". Fighting back to the attackers may fear them not to attack 
again. However, innocents may be affected by this approach. For example, 
the computer attacking you may be hacked and controlled by some other real 
attackers. The owner of the attacking computer is actually a victim also. 
Deterrence means "deterring the initiation or continuation of an intrusion attempt 
by increasing the effort for an attack to succeed, increasing the risk associated 
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with the attack, and/or devaluing the perceived gain that would come with 
success". This assumes an attacker would only launch an attack on an "easy" 
system rather than on a "hard" one. However, that is not necessary true. If 
the attackers intentionally target the attack on a particular system, an "easy" 
system or a "hard" system makes no different to them. 
Deflection means "leading an intruder to believe that he has succeeded in an intru-
sion attempt, where-else instead he has been attracted or shunted off to where 
harm is minimized". However, you would have to setup one or more dummy 
computers. Having dummy computers can be costly and inconvenient. Also, it 
may not be easy to cheat novice intruders. 
Detection means "discriminating intrusion attempts and intrusion preparation from 
normal activity and alerting the authorities". The intrusion detection system 
is exactly doing this. However, most of them can just detect an intrusion but 
cannot prevent the damage on the target machine. 
Countermeasures means "actively and autonomously countering an intrusion as it 
is being attempted". Autonomously launching an action once an intrusion is 
found sounds good. However, you may catch an innocents. Stopping or even 
punishing them right the way can be annoying to legitimate users. 
2.3 The Need for Intrusion Detection System 
If we were able to prevent an intrusion, then why do we bother to detect intrusions. 
Thus the conventional model to secure a system is to shield the network from the 
outside. An outsider need to authenticate himself before entering the system. Also, 
in order to prevent information being sniffed by other non-authorized people, cryp-
tography measures may be used. 
However, such prevention model has a number of limitation, as outlined below [12]: 
• It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to build an useful system which is absolutely 
secure. There are always some problems out there, either the design flaws in 
a large system or the administrative flaws like mis-configuration of equipments 
and poor administrative policy and practice. 
• Even if there exist a new and very secure system, we cannot assume we would 
replace the old yet working system. This would involve in a large investment 
and testing. 
• This kind of prevention-based security policy constrains a user's activities; the 
current "open" mode of operation in most systems is regarded by many to be a 
highly-useful environment for promoting users' productivity. 
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• The cryptography model is good in theory, but may not be in practice. Cryp-
tography cannot prevent users from losing keys or poorly designed passwords. 
• Even the system is really secure against outsiders, the threat from insiders still 
exist. A survey show that insiders are the major source of attacks [13 . 
Thus IDS is used to cope with the limitation listed above. 
2.4 Intrusion Detection System Categorization 
We can categorize an IDS in different dimensions. We can differentiate an IDS in 
terms of the origin of the information sources comes from 一 from the destination 
host or from the network traffic. The result of this differentiation is the host-based 
detection and the network-based detection. We can also differentiate an IDS in terms 
of how one define an intrusion — activities not normal or activities already known as 
intrusions. The result of this differentiation is the anomaly detection approach and 
the misuse detection approach. Another way to differentiate is how many detectors or 
analyzers is placed in the system — just a fixed number for the whole or dynamically 
depends on how many computers in the system. The result of this differentiation is 
the centralized system and the distributed system. 
Please note that each kind of categorizations is overlapping each other. We can 
have a centralized network-based misuse detection IDS. We can also have a distributed 
network-based anomaly detection IDS (see figure 2.1). 
2.4.1 Network-based vs. Host-based 
Network-based IDS 
The network-based IDS {NWS) is mainly passively placed in the segment of the LAN 
to listen all the traffic there. It uses the network packets as the source of information in 
detecting intrusion. With the feature of the Ethernet protocol, all the traffic actually 
broadcast to all the hosts inside the segment of the LAN. Thus, a NIDS can be placed 
at any point in the segment of the LAN to capture all the network traffic there for 
analysis. 
One of the advantages of NIDS is that only one or a few detection engines is 
needed for the whole segment. It can centralized the management and deployment 
of the detection engines. Installing and maintaining only one machine is much easier 
and less costly. Also it does not interfere with anything in the existing computers — 
needless to install anything or even change any settings. 
However, there are some disadvantages. As mentioned, NIDS is based on the 
broadcast nature of the Ethernet protocol. However, with the use of switches instead 
of hubs, that nature no longer exists. With the use of switches, the packet would 
only transfer to the packet's real destination instead of broadcasting to all. Also, with 
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Figure 2.1: Categorization of Intrusion Detection Systems 
more and more traffics are encrypted, NIDS, without the decryption key, can do little 
to analysis the packets for the intrusion detection. 
Network-Node IDS 
The network-node IDS is a variation from NIDS. Instead of just using one single 
IDS to monitor the whole segment, each computer in the segment has its own IDS 
detector. The network-node IDS in each computer only monitors traffic destinate to 
it but not the others. As a result, unlike NIDS, the use of switches or hubs is the 
same to network-node IDS. Also, since each computer has its own network-node IDS, 
network-node IDS is able to get the description key inside the computer to decrypt 
the traffic for analysis. 
Host-based IDS 
The host-based IDS is placed in every computers in the network. It is designed to 
monitor, detect and respond to user and system activities on a given host. It keeps 
track of information inside a single host, from CPU time, memory usages to audit trails 
and user behaviors. The difference between host-based IDS and NIDS is that NIDS 
monitor traffics between hosts while host-based IDS only monitor activities inside the 
host. 
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The major advantage of the host-based IDS is that it can monitor the actual 
behavior in the host. The accuracy is thus increased. Also, it can detect intrusions 
not passing through the network — directly from the console. The NIDS do not have 
much hope to detect the physical attack since the attack does not produce any network 
activities. 
One of the disadvantages of the host-based IDS is the deployment issue — every 
computer in the network need one to monitor and detect intrusions. Whenever any 
settings in the IDS need to change, every computer under detection need to change. 
Also, it requires installing softwares and changing settings in the computers, which 
may affect the services provided by the computers. Moreover, the IDS would use up 
some CPU time and some memory to monitor and detect intrusions. The use of more 
computational powers is not desirable for some heavily loaded servers. 
Application Level IDS 
The application level IDS is a special type of the host-based IDS. It gets informations 
directly from the applications running on the machines. The application level IDS 
provides some API, which have to be implemented by the application developers, 
for applications to provide necessary informations to the IDS. In this way, IDS can 
perfectly reconstruct the statuses in the application under monitoring. Thus it can 
detect possible intrusions more easily and accurately. However, the problem of the 
application level IDS is that it cannot detect any intrusions before the provided API 
is called by the application. Also, there is no standard of such API for the application 
developers to follow right now. 
2.4.2 Anomaly Detection vs. Misuse Detection 
Anomaly Detection 
The anomaly detection approach looks for unusual or statistical anomalous behaviors 
by users on a system. It assumes that an intrusion are a rare event when compared 
to normal behaviors. 
First, the anomaly detection system have to construct the user profiles for the 
normal behaviors. With that as reference, we can know whether a given behavior is 
an intrusion or not. The user profile can be built at the first beginning, or adaptively 
changed afterward. With the user profile, we can detect an intrusion by comparing 
the actual behavior with the stored user profile. The comparison can be in statistical 
means, artificial intelligent means, etc. 
One of the problems in the anomaly detection approach is that administrators 
have to define how much difference between the actual behavior and the user profile is 
an intrusion. If the threshold is too large, then possible intrusions may not be able to 
detect. If the threshold is too small, then legitimate behaviors may be determine as an 
intrusion. This kind of false alarm problem is also one of the major problems in IDS 
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(Refer to section 4.6.1 on page 36). Moreover, the anomaly detection IDS actually 
detects for rare events only. A rare event do not necessary means an intrusion. The 
user may just want to try out some new softwares and that may result in considering 
as an intrusion! Worse still, an attacker can train the user profile such that the IDS 
would consider an attack as a normal event. 
Misuse Detection 
This type of detection looks for known intrusion in the system. It keeps a database 
of known intrusion, called signature. Then it compare the actual usage with the 
database. If there is a match, intrusion is found. It is also called signature-based IDS. 
The major problem for this type of detection is it only looks for known intrusions. 
It cannot do anything on the unknown intrusions. Thus the intrusion database need to 
be frequently updated to detect new attacks. Even so, from discovering a new attack 
to updating its signature to the intrusion database may require days of operation. 
The attacker can use the window of time to launch an attack without detected. 
2.4.3 Centralized vs. Distributed 
Centralized IDS 
The centralized IDS means data monitoring and analysis is performed on a fixed 
number of computers, independent of how large the network is. 
With the success of network-based IDS, it is possible to have centralized IDS. All 
the policy changes an updates can be done easily on a single or a few computers. At 
the time of such IDS purposed, the network speed is relatively slow and only have 
very few computers when compare to today's environment. A fixed number of analysis 
and detection components is capable to cope with the whole network. However, with 
the increasing network speed and lower computer cost, the network traffic and the 
number of computers in the whole system can be very huge today. The centralized 
system cannot cope with such growth. 
Distributed IDS 
The distributed IDS (DIDS) means data monitoring and analysis is performed on a 
varied number of computers, proportional to the number of hosts inside the network 
under monitoring. 
The DIDS is developed to deal with the scalability problem in the centralized IDS. 
Since the number of data monitoring and analysis components are proportional to the 
number of hosts inside the network, it can be deployed to nearly all networks with any 
size. One of the major problems of the DIDS is the difficulty to detect global changes 
since the data analysis are distributed around the network. Also, it is difficult to 
deploy the DIDS to the whole network since it involves in installing relatively a lot of 
components. 
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Many modern DIDS use the hierarchical structure. The architecture is a tree 
structure with the command and control system at the root, the information aggre-
gation units at the internal nodes, and the operational units at the leaf nodes. The 
hierarchical structure is an ideal way to detect and respond attacks on a large net-
work. The major weakness of the hierarchical structure is the system would cease to 
function if an attacker can successfully attack the root node. One of the solution to 
this problem is to use the mobile agent technology [14], Mobile agents can be used to 
wrap around the internal IDS components. The IDS components can then hide within 
the network, evade an attacker during an attack, and to recover from being killed. 
2.5 Agent-based IDS 
The agent-based IDS is a kind of implementation of DIDS. A software agent can be 
defined as [15]: 
. . . a software entity which functions continuously and autonomously in a 
particular environment... able to carry out activities in a flexible and intel-
ligent manner that is responsive to changes in the environment . . . Ideally, 
an agent that functions continuously . . .we expect an agent that inhabits 
an environment with other agents and processes to be able to communicate 
and cooperate with them . . . 
The benefits of agent-based IDS includes [16]: 
• Since each agent is a single entity, they can be added, removed, or modified 
without affecting the other agents inside the intrusion detection system. 
• Agents can be tested independently before deployed in the complex real envi-
ronment. 
• To keep it simple, each agent can be designed to just do a small piece of job. 
By communicating between agents, agents can accomplish complex tasks. 
2.6 Mobile agent-based IDS 
The mobile agent-based IDS is another kind of implementation of DIDS. The agent 
used here is mobile instead of static. Mobile agents offer several advantage over static 
or centralized components [17] [18] [19]: 
Overcoming Network Latency Mobile agent can be dispatched to carry out op-
erations, including detecting and response, directly at the remote point of inter-
est. The response to an intrusion will be much faster than the hierarchical IDS, 
which need to communicate to a centralized coordinator located somewhere on 
the network. 
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Reducing Network Load Instead of transferring huge amount of data, such as au-
dit logs, to the centralized analysis engine to detect intrusions, the mobile agent 
can be sent to the remote machine to do analysis and thus reduce the network 
loading. There is a side benefit when confidentiality is a concern. The efficiency 
of using mobile agents is increased when moving encrypted agent and its refined 
data instead of encrypting all the raw data. 
Autonomous and Asynchronous Execution Since each mobile agent act inde-
pendently, it can still function well even if a portion of agents get destroyed or 
separated. This can increases the fault tolerance of the overall system. 
Dynamic Adaptation Mobile agents have the ability to sense the change in envi-
ronment and react to such changes. This ability is very useful in the intrusion 
detection system. Agents can move elsewhere to gather information or to avoid 
being attack, can clone themselves for redundancy and parallelism, or can mar-
shal other agents for assistance. 
Static Adaption (Upgradeablity) For misuse detection, it is important to keep 
the attack signature database up-to-date. Instead of shutting down the whole 
IDS to do the update, a new mobile agent with new signatures can be sent out 
to work while the whole IDS is still running. 
However, it also suffers from a number of disadvantages [17]: 
Security The main obstacles to use mobile agents in IDS is it presents a number 
of security threats that are not addressed by conventional security techniques. 
The security threats includes agent-to-agent, agent-to-platform, platform-to-
agent and other-to-agent platform. The agent-to-agent refers to those threats in 
which agents launch attacks against other agents. The agent-to-platform refers 
to those threats in which agents launch attacks against the agent platform. The 
platform-to-agent refers to those threats in which platform compromise the se-
curity of agents. The other-to-agent platform refers to those threats in which 
external entities, including agents and agent platforms, launch attacks against 
agent platform. 
Code Size IDS is a complex piece of software, so its code size is large. Using agents 
to implement an IDS would not reduce the code size. With such a large agent, 
the time taken to transfer from one host to another could be very long. In addi-
tional, such a transfer would require a large amount of computing and network 
resources. 
Performance For the agent to be mobile across different platform, the implemen-
tation will most likely to use cross-platform scripts or interpreted language. 
However, scripts or interpreted languages have a relatively slow execution speed 
when compare to native code. Thus, using such implementation could greatly 
affect the performance. 
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Survey on Intrusion Step 
3.1 Introduction 
Before we goes on to talk about how to prevent and detect intrusion, we first have to 
know how an attacker attacks a computer system. Just like cops, they need to know 
the "techniques" used by the criminals so that they can catch criminals and tell the 
public how to prevent them. 
Basically there are 3 major steps in launching an attack. The first step is to scan 
for the target computer system. The next step is to perform the actual intrusion. The 
final step is to do some post-intrusion work, such as installing some back-doors for 
re-visiting the system later, covering tracks or logs during the attack, etc. 
3.2 Getting information before break in 
3.2.1 Port scanning 
In the TCP/IP framework, each network service is identified by a port number [20 . 
When a client wants to communicate to a service in a server, it needs to know the 
server's IP address as well as the port number of that service. For some well-know 
service, the port number is defined, known as well-known port [21]. For example, web 
service are normally assigned to TCP port 80. 
For an attacker, before launching an attack, he needs to know what services, ie. 
the port, is open on the server machine(s) and which server is up in the target network. 
This is known as port-scanning. Below are ways to perform port scanning [22] [23] [24]: 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) scanning The ARP scanning is used to 
discover the network device in a given local network. It makes use of the ARP 
broadcast to make every network device to response to its IP. It is very efficient 
to map out the whole local network. 
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ICMP echo scanning The ICMP echo scanning is used to determine which host is 
up by sending ICMP echo packet. If a host is up, it would reply an echo packet. 
If not, it would not. 
TCP connect0 scanning The TCP connect() scanning is the most basic form of 
port scanning. The idea is to connect to a a particular port on the target server 
and close it immediately afterward. If success, then the port is listening. If 
not, then the port is closed. The technique is fast and don't require any special 
privilege to perform the scanning. However, the target machine can easily detect 
such activities and so can filter it out. 
TCP SYN scanning The TCP SYN scanning, or called half-open scanning, is a 
kind of stealth scanning technique. You do not complete the whole TCP hand-
shaking when first connect to the target machine. Instead, you just send the 
SYN packet and wait for the response. If the response is SYN—ACK, then the 
port is listening. You then send a RST to close down the connection. If the 
response is a RST, then the port is not listening. The advantage is fewer ma-
chines would detect such activities. However, you will need a root privilege to 
carry out the scanning because you are trying to customize the TCP connection 
handshaking. 
TCP FIN, Xmas tree, NULL scanning They are the more advanced stealth scan-
ning techniques. They make use of the requirement in TCP [25] — closed ports 
reply FIN packet with RST but open port ignore it. These three kinds of scans 
are similar with just the flag used in the packet is different 一 FIN scan use only 
FIN flag, Xmas tree scan use FIN, URG and PUSH flags and NULL scan use 
no flag. 
Fragmentation scanning The fragmentation scanning is not a new form of port 
scans. It just makes the target machine more difficult to detect when used 
together with the above techniques. Instead of sending a single probe packet, 
you split the probe packet into a number of IP fragment using TCP's properties. 
By doing so, the target host need to gather all the IP fragments in order to know 
what is going on. 
TCP reverse ident scanning The TCP reverse ident scanning is used to identify 
the owner of the service connected by you. It makes use of ident protocol [26 
which allows for the disclosure of the user name of the owner of the process 
connected via TCP. Therefore, using full TCP connection to a target ports can 
detect out who is the owner of those listening ports. 
FTP bounce attack The FTP bounce attack makes use of the FTP proxy connec-
tion in the FTP protocol. It makes use of other people's FTP server as FTP 
proxy to scan the target machines. The target machine only knows the FTP 
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server is scanning it but do not know it is you scanning the machine. However, 
most FTP servers usually turn off the support of FTP proxy. 
UDP ICMP port unreachable scanning The UDP scanning is much more diffi-
cult than TCP scanning because UDP is connectionless and do not need to send 
acknowledgment for open port nor error for closed port upon connection. The 
UDP ICMP port unreachable scanning makes use the fact that many host do 
send ICMP message ICMP_PORT_UNREACH when a packet is sent to a closed 
UDP port. Thus we can determine whether the UDP port is open or not by 
intercepting the ICMP message. However, since UDP and ICMP packets don't 
guarantee to the successfully arrive, this type of scanning is not very reliable. 
Also many machines limit ICMP error message rate [27], so the scanning speed 
is quite slow. 
Although port-scanning is known to be the first step to perform attack, but itself 
is a legal activity in many countries [28] [29]. 
3.2.2 Sniffing 
The sniffing technique is to capture network packets that you are not suppose to 
receive. That is, you are capturing those network packets that are not destinate to 
the host you're in. It is a very useful technique. You can use it to see the plaintext 
password when others trying to login some other machines; you can use it to view 
other people's email to get anything useful. 
Originally, the sniffing technique can be used only in a non-switched network. 
However, with the advancement of "technology", it can also be used in a switched 
network now. For a non-switched network, sniffing is possible due to the broadcast 
nature of the Ethernet protocol. In the Ethernet, all the packets is broadcasted to all 
hosts under the same segment. It is the host to decide whether to drop it or to keep it 
—the packet destinate to it should be kept while others should be dropped. However, 
you can change this characteristics so that you can keep all the packets, whether it is 
destinate to you or not. 
The broadcast nature of the Ethernet protocol is true in a non-switched network, 
but no longer true in a switched network. In the switched network, only the packets 
really destinate to you would send to you. Other packets would not send to you 
anymore. Then how can we still do sniffing? That are various methods as shown 
below [30] [31]: 
ARP Spoofing [32] The idea is to poison the ARP (address resolution protocol) 
cache in the senders' machines so that the sender thinks the attacker controlled 
machine is the gateway. Since all the data must pass through the gateway to get 
outside, the attacker can capture all the packets. The attacker would send forged 
ARP packets to the network to pretend his controlled machine is the gateway. 
Thus all the packets would forward to the controlled machine. Afterward, it 
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would forward the packets to the real gateway so that it seems nothing happens 
between the sender and the real receiver. 
M A C Flooding [33] The idea is to flood a lot of MAC addresses to the switch. 
Since many switch have limited space to store the MAC address, switch will 
soon "hangs" and become "fail open" 一 back to hubs mode. Then attackers 
can use back the non-switched network technique to do sniffing. 
M A C Duplicating [32] This is similar to the ARP spoofing but not the same. 
The ARP spoofing targets on polluting the sender to think you are the gateway 
machine. The MAC duplicating targets on polluting the switch to think you 
and the real destination having the same MAC address. Thus, the switch would 
forward the packets to you and to the real destination. 
3.2.3 Fingerprinting 
Fingerprinting is very useful before carry out attack because many security holes 
depend on the OS and the program that the target is running. The easiest way is to 
see the "banner" from various programs. For example, when you telnet to a UNIX or 
LINUX machine, you could see the OS version by default. Another example is when 
you establish a http connection to the Microsoft IIS web server, it would tell you what 
version of the IIS is running and on what version of the windows machine. 
Of course, a careful administrators would turn off all these banners, but there are 
still some ways to find out the OS and the program that the target is running. The 
techniques includes the FIN probe, the BOGUS flag probe, the TCP ISN sampling, the 
don't fragment bit, the TCP initial window, the ACK value, the ICMP error message 
quenching, the ICMP message quoting, the ICMP error message echoing integrity, the 
type of service, the fragmentation handling, the TCP options, the exploit chronology 
and the SYN Flood Resistance [34]. By combining the results from various of this 
techniques, it is possible to determine what OS the target machine is running. 
3.3 Intrusion method 
3.3.1 DOS and DDOS 
The denial of service {DOS) attack is to disable the target system, making it in-
responsive to other clients. Attackers would not get any information about the target 
system by launching this type of attack. They launch this attack either because they 
have some personal or political affairs with the target system or to help to launch 
other type of attacks [35 . 
There are mainly four types of DOS attack [35]: 
Bandwidth Consumption As the name stated, the bandwidth consumption attack 
consume all the bandwidth in the target system. This can be done because 
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either the attacker's network have a higher bandwidth than the victim's one or 
the attacker amplify the attacks using some other sites with high bandwidth. 
The idea of amplification is like this [36]: The attacker builds an ICMP echo 
request package with source address forge to be the target machine. Then the 
attacker sends it to a broadcast address with a large subnet, perfectly the subnet 
is with high bandwidth. The all the hosts in that subnet would reply the ICMP 
echo request and forward it to the target machine, flooding the target machines 
with ICMP echo reply. 
Resource Starvation The resource starvation attack refers to consume all the sys-
tem resources so that it cannot process other clients' request. System resources 
generally refer to CPU utilization, memory, file-system space, etc. It is often 
caused by legitimate access from attackers who abuse this access to consume 
additional resources. 
Programming Flaws The programming flaws attack refers to the bugs in OS, soft-
ware programs which cannot free the system resources or result in system crash 
under certain situation. Such situation is mainly some exceptional cases and 
those that are not comply with the standard protocols. 
Routing and DNS Attacks The routing and DNS attacks refer to redirect the tar-
get system's traffic into attackers' network or into something not exists. This 
can be done because of the week authentication of many routing and DNS pro-
tocols. The attackers can easily poison the routing table or DNS cache to launch 
such attack. 
The DOS attack is launched from a single host, while distributed denial of service 
(DDOS) attack is launched from a number of hosts (called zombies) controlled by the 
attacker. The attacker first attacks a number of hosts by the other intrusion method 
we mentioned later to become zombies. Then they install some DDOS software client, 
such as TFN2K [37], which listens for attacker's command, into the zombies. Once 
there are enough zombies, it is time to launch the attack. The attacker would send 
commands to the zombies to attack which site and use what kind of DOS attack 
method. Since the attack comes from a number of zombies, the target machine needs 
to block all the zombies in order to survive. Because the attacker controls others to 
perform the attack, it is very difficult to detect. Please note the the whole process 
of DDOS, from finding zombies to actual launch the attack, can be easily done using 
automated tools. 
3.3.2 Password cracking 
Although it is known that the password authentication mechanism has many weak-
ness, there are still many software using it as the authentication mechanism. If the 
password is transmitted in plaintext through the network, attackers can use the sniff-
ing technique (described in section 3.2.2 on page 16) to grab the password. Another 
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Figure 3.1: Memory Structure 
weakness is the poorly chosen password by users. Many users would use their name, 
habits, etc, or with some modifications, as password. This kind of password can be 
easily found inside a dictionary. Therefore, the search space by attackers is largely 
reduced. Attackers can then try the password inside a pre-defined list of possible 
passwords. This is known as dictionary attack. The try and error process can be 
done off-line. Attackers obtain some known encrypted password strings in the net-
work, then use dictionary attack to try to reproduce such strings. Depends on using 
what encryption algorithm and how well the password is, this attack can complete the 
process in days, in hours or only in a few seconds. 
3.3.3 Buffer overflows 
It is caused by bugs in the software. This bugs let attackers can execute anything they 
want on the machine, including destroying all the data in the machine or installing 
back-doors for later reentering the system (see section 3.4.2). 
Before we discuss what kind of bugs would cause buffer overflows, let's explain 
how a program is executed in an operation system. Inside a program, there are many 
functions, which are calling each others. When a function, say function A, calls another 
function, say functionB, all the status, including memory address of current position 
in functionA (return address), would be stored into a stack (see figure 3.1). When 
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functions returns, the OS knows where should functionB return to functionA by the 
return address stored in the stack. This stack is also stored in the memory, just like 
other data structures do (see figure 3.1). Let's imagine that now functionB needs to 
input some strings from the network, and the programmer just allocate 10 bytes to 
store it. However, he forgets to check whether the input string is really 10 bytes in his 
program and just writes it into the memory. Now here is the problem — what happen 
if the input string is much longer than 10 bytes? It would replace other memory space 
that are not supposed to, including the stack storing status. Continue to imagine the 
string replaces the return address in the stack. Then when functionB returns, it would 
not return back to functionA but to other position stated in the string. That is buffer 
overflows! As shown in this example, buffer overflows occur when programmer fail to 
do boundary check on the input variables. 
Then how attackers use this technique to attack the system? When such bugs are 
discovered, attackers sends strings that would caused buffer overflow to the program. 
Inside the strings, it contains some small programming code, such as executing a shell. 
When the input string replaces the return address in the stack, it changes that address 
to the start of the small programming code by the attacker. Then such code would be 
executed. Worse still, most daemon is running as root, so do the attacker's code. That 
means the code can let attacker to do whatever he wants without any restrictions. 
Details on buffer overflows can refer to [38] [39 . 
3.3.4 Race Condition 
It is also caused by bugs in the software. It is the synchronization errors between 
threads or processes within a piece of software. This kind of synchronization errors 
creates a window that one process/thread can interfere with another. It is possible 
that such window would cause security vulnerability, including letting a normal user 
to gain more privilege, or modifying files owned by the user running that software, 
normally as root/administrator. 
3.3.5 Session Hijacking 
It is not caused by any particular softwares, it is the problem in the TCP/IP protocol 
itself. The TCP/IP allows a packet to be spoofed and inserted into the session be-
tween two hosts. Since most application level protocol would only do authentication 
at the first beginning and would not do it again afterward, attackers can hijack the ses-
sion after the client have finish authentication. Attackers can then insert commands, 
pretended to be the authorized client, to be executed in the remote host. 
Note that the session hijacking attack is possible in many plaintext application 
level protocol, but not for encrypted one. Most encrypted protocol is signed by the 
host before sending to the other end, which cannot be forged by the attackers. Thus 
anything not from the authenticated host would be immediately known. 
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3.3.6 Computer Virus 
The team computer virus is first defined formally by Fred Cohen [40]. His definition 
of computer virus is "a program that can infect other programs by modifying them 
to include a possibly evolved copy of itself，. When that infected file is opened, so 
does the embedded virus. The user would not know that the virus is running as the 
infected file is running as normal. When the virus is executed, it would find other files 
in the same computer to infect, or do some malicious acts on the computer. It does 
not deliberately spread itself from one computer to another [41 . 
There are basically three types of virus: file infectors, boot-sector viruses and 
macro viruses [42]. 
File infectors infect files containing applications, which is executable. When an 
user executes the infected program, the virus executes first and put itself into 
the computer's memory. Later on when other program runs, the virus in the 
memory would copy itself to this program and thus infect them. 
Boot-sector viruses reside in a special part of storage medium like the diskette 
or the hard disk. When the computer starts, the viruses would read into the 
memory and get executed. This special part in the storage medium is normally 
refer to as the boot sector as it contains code for loading the rest of the operating 
system. The viruses infect this code so that the virus is loaded before the rest 
of the operating system is loaded. Once loaded, the virus can infect other hard 
disks or floppy diskettes in the floppy drive to infect other computers. 
Macro viruses infect files that are usually regarded as data rather than programs. 
It different from the above two which depend on the computer's operating sys-
tem ——it depends only on the software that reads the data files. The macro 
viruses use an application macro language to infect an replicate documents and 
templates. Many spreadsheet, word-processing programs have macro capabil-
ity that allows documents to carry out certain actions when loaded. The virus 
writer can then use such feature to write macro codes to insert unwanted words, 
numbers to other documents, and attach the virus to other documents once they 
are opened. 
3.3.7 Worms 
The first worm program was born in 1982 [43]. The worm program was an experiment 
in the development of distributed computations. The worms replicate themselves 
and span in different machines. Although it is not the first program that replicate 
themselves and move to different machines, it is the first such program named as 
"worms" [44]. This worms does not do harm on the system, it is just an experiment 
programs in the distributed environment. Quite different from what we know now. 
The first worm attack 一 the Morris worm is in 1988 [44]. It exploits flaws in 
programs on the UNIX operating system. Once break in, it collects host, network and 
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user information and replicate itself to break into other machines installing the same 
kind of operating systems. It spread very fast at that time and create a great impact on 
the Internet. After this event, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) 
establish the CERT (The Computer Emergency Response Team) at the Software 
Engineering Institute at the Carnegie-Mellon University. The purpose of CERT is to 
prevent and respond to such occurrences in the future [45]. 
Although look the same, worms and viruses are different. Viruses need human help 
to propagate from one computer to another, including emailing an infected document, 
or sharing an infected document. Worms are different — they self-replicate themselves 
from one machine to another using network medium. Also, they do not hide in another 
files, as viruses do. 
The worms can propagate itself in two different ways [46]: 
Self-launching worms As its name stated, it is fully automatic, no need human 
interaction. The worms exploits some aspect of the host to enable it to spread 
to new systems and get executed automatically. 
User-launching worms In the opposite as self-launching worms, it needs user to 
execute the worm when spreading to a new system. For example, user need to 
open the attachment of email containing the worm. 
3.3.8 Trojan Horse 
The name Trojan Horse comes from an old Greek story. At that time, The Greeks 
besieged Troy for ten years, but still cannot conquer it. The Greeks thought of a way 
to defeat the Trojan. The Greeks built a large wooden horse and put some soldiers 
inside. The Greek soldiers then left the horse for the Trojan as an admission of defeat 
and pretended to retreat. The Trojan really thought they won and got the horse 
inside their city to celebrate. At that night, the Greek soldiers went out from the 
horse and open the gates to let the rest of Greek soldiers to come in. The Troy then 
got conquered. 
In the digital world, a Trojan Horse is a software that pretends to be something 
useful. However, behind the scene it does something you do not expected. The hardest 
part of the Trojan Horse attack may be the method of how to get the Trojan Horse 
into the victim's computer. Attackers can attack the system using all kinds of method 
shown in this sections and install the Trojan Horse into the system. The programs 
in rootkits (see section 3.4.3) are mainly Trojan Horses. Attackers can also use social 
engineering technique (see section 3.3.9) to let victim to execute it. 
3.3.9 Social Engineering 
It is a very effective way of hacking. It bypasses anything technological: cryptography, 
computer security, network security, etc. It goes straight to attack the weakest link 
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in the system: the poor human being trying to get his job done and wanting to help 
out if he can [8]. 
It is quite simple to carry out social engineering. Many of such attacks is through 
the telephone or email, which do not need to show the attackers' face. If the attackers 
have enough knowledge about the system, most of the time it works. Attackers can 
pretend to be legitimate users of the system in a high position to ask the administrator 
to tell him the password to access the system or lower down the defense of the system. 
Another round also works: an attacker can pretend to be an administrator and ask 
legitimate users of the system to tell him the password so that he can help out to fix 
some problems, or other excuses you can/cannot imagine. Anything you can/cannot 
imagine to cheat human being in the system to let you in belongs to social engineering 
attack. 
3.3.10 Physical Attack 
Physical attack refers to the attack not requiring network connection. The attacker 
physically goes to the target machine to perform the attack. I would not provide 
details here. 
3.4 After intrusion 
3.4.1 Covering Tracks 
Even if attackers can successfully enter the system, and finish all the things he wants 
to do, he can be caught afterward. He needs to do something to prevent him from 
being caught. The principle is just the same as in the physical world. In a crime 
scene, the criminal would erase all the fingerprints of himself. Similarly, in the digital 
world, all the logs and tracks related to his attack would be erased from the system. 
If attackers plans to revisit the site later on, the loggers would even be turned off. 
3.4.2 Back-doors 
After attackers successfully enter the system, most likely they will install some back-
door programs so that they can re-enter the system easily next time. Most back-
doors are network daemons that listen for attackers' command. In order to cover the 
existence of such back-door programs, Trojaned system programs, which pretend to 
be real system programs but try to hide all the information on the tracks of intrusions, 
are used. Such Trojaned system programs are also included in the rootkits. Details 
on the rootkits are on section 3.4.3. 
3.4.3 Rootkits 
It refers to a collections of Trojan Horses which is used to substitute system binaries 
commonly used in an operating system. It seems to perform the same function as 
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usual to the user. However, it covers all the things working behind by the attackers. 
For example, in UNIX platform, rootkits include Trojaned ps, netstat, Is, etc. When 
you run Trojaned ps, you can see all normal process, but you cannot see the back-
doors running by the attackers. When you run Trojaned netstat, you can see all the 
normal network activities, but you cannot see the attackers are sending commands to 
the back-doors, which are listening to a certain port. When you run Trojaned Is, you 
can see all the files in your system, except the files placed by attackers! 
3.5 Conclusion 
Here is just a glimpse of threats in the network world. It serves as a purpose for you to 




A Survey on Intrusion Detection 
System 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is to provide an overall view on the advancement of the intrusion de-
tection system (IDS). The basic operation of IDS is like this: IDS is responsible for 
monitoring and detecting for possible attacks. Once an attack is detected, it would 
alert system security officer {SSO) and take necessary actions. Thus an IDS can be 
divided into three parts, the information source, the detection engine and the intrusion 
response. In additional, we will also describe the challenges in developing an IDS. 
4.2 Information Source 
We say intrusion detection, of course there are something for the detector to detect. 
That kind of data is called the information source for the intrusion detection system. 
The information source can be divided into three category, the host-based source, the 
network-based source and the out-of-band source [47 . 
4.2.1 Host-based Source 
This is the information available inside the target computer. It includes audit trail of 
the operating system and logs of the operating system and the applications, etc. 
Audit Trail 
Audit trails are generated by a specialized auditing subsystem inside the operating 
system. Audit trails are a collection of files, with each files containing an audit record 
for a single system event. The records include events in the kernel level (reflecting 
system calls) and at the user level (reflecting application events). Kernel level records 
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include system call arguments and return values while user level records include ap-
plication specific data. 
Note that the requirements of most audit trails follows the one defined in the 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, known as the "Orange Book" in the 
"Rainbow Series" [48]. Although following the same requirements, audit trails' struc-
ture and data are system dependent. Therefore, intrusion detection system need to 
have different interface for different audit trail format or transform the audit trails 
into standard formats before processing them [49]. There are already some researches 
on standardizing the format of audit trails so as to simplify the detection engine design 
and allow interpretability of audit systems on a very large scale [50 . 
Logs 
Opposite to the audit trails, logs are usually in a higher level of description of what 
is going on in the system. As a result, it is much simpler to review. In the situation 
when generating audit trails is infeasible, either because of not enough CPU time or 
storage spaces, logs are a good mean to keep track of system activities. 
However, logs are less trustworthy than audit trails. Since logging mechanism is 
usually in application level, it is much easier to subvert than audit system, which is a 
subsystem of the operating system. Moreover, logs are usually place in an unprotected 
folder. Attackers can easily modify the logs to cover their tracks (see section 3.4.1 on 
page 23 for more detail). 
4.2.2 Network-based Source 
This is the information source available in the packets flow in or out from the sys-
tem. Using the same technique as sniffing (see section 3.2.2 on page 16), packets are 
captured for analysis. 
Advantage for such source includes: 
• The monitor does not affect the performance of other process in other hosts 
on the network. That is because it can be placed at any point in the network 
segment to monitor the traffic comes across the segment. 
• The monitor is transparent to the users on the network, so attackers is difficult 
to locate, subvert or disable it. 
• It can be used to monitor events difficult to monitor by host-based source, in-
cluding DOS attack (see section 3.3.1 on page 17) or malformed packets. 
However, it cannot detect the attacks that do not require network, like the physical 
attack (see section 3.3.10 on page 23). 
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Figure 4.1: Data Fusion Model 
4.2.3 Out-of-band Source 
This is the information source by non-system means, including human beings. This 
category of source is often ignored by researchers of IDS [47]. Events from this source 
include power failures, natural disasters, etc. 
4.2.4 Data Fusion from multiple sources 
In a large network environment, there could be a large number of information sources 
described above to detect intrusions. The problem is that it is difficult to correlate 
each sensors' data for detection engine to analysis. Tim Bass had presented a model 
to accomplish this task [51] [52]. It is based on the model presented by Waltz for 
physical Environment [53]. Figure 4.1 shows the architecture for data fusion. 
There are three level of abstractions during the data fusion process [52]: 
Data The measurements and observations from various information source. 
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Information The data placed in context, indexed and organized. 
Knowledge The information explained and understood. 
The operation is summarized as follows: 
• The raw data is collected from various information source with primitive obser-
vation identifiers, times of observation and descriptions. 
• The level 0 Refinement calibrate and filter the raw data in step 1 
• The level 1 Object Refinement align the result in step 2 and 1 to a common 
frame of reference in time. Weighted metrics based on the relative importance 
is assigned. 
• The Object base is formed from the aggregated sets of objects in step 3. 
• The level 2 Situation Refinement provides situational knowledge and aware-
ness by detecting the object base's coordinated behavior, dependencies, common 
points of origin, common protocols, common targets, correlated attack rates, or 
other high-level attribute. 
• The level 3 Threat Assessment is the result of examination of objects and aggre-
gated groups against existing ID templates by using situation knowledge from 
step 5. 
• The Situation Base is formed by correlation between the Level 3 Threat Assess-
ment and the security policy and objects. 
• The level 4 Resource Management based on the current situational awareness 
to further refine detection, forming an ID-data fusion feedback loop. 
4.3 Detection Technology 
4.3.1 Intrusion signature 
Rule-based System 
The rule-based system is an expert system which rules are fired when data from 
information source seems suspicious. The rules may represent a single data record or 
a sequence of records from the information source. 
Although it is simple to implement, there are number of limitations. Rule-based 
system have their rules a direct dependence on the data from the information source. 
It leads to inflexibility for such one-to-one representation. When there is a small 
variation on the attack scenario, the system may be unable to identify (see section 4.6.3 
on page 37). 
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State Transition Analysis 
The state transition analysis uses state transition diagram to represent an intrusion. 
It compares the current system states with the known attack transition diagram to 
detect intrusion. 
In this approach, an attack is viewed as a sequence of actions from initial state 
to final compromise state represented by the state transition diagram [54] [55]. The 
following definition is directly cited from [54]: 
...where a state is a snapshot of the system representing the values of all 
volatile，semi-permanent and permanent memory locations on the system. 
The initial state corresponds to the state of the system just prior to the 
execution of the penetration, and the compromised state corresponds to 
the state of the system resulting from the completion of the penetration. 
Between the initial and compromised states are one of more intermedi-
ate state transitions that an attacker performs to achieve the compromise. 
..• Signature actions refer to those actions that, if omitted from the ex-
ecution of an attack scenario, would prevent the attack from completing 
successfully.... 
Note that the signature actions quoted above refer to the action for the transition 
from one state to another. 
The state transition analysis have an assumption that all the computer attacks 
share two common features [54]: 
• The attacker requires some minimum prerequisite access to the target system 
for launching attacks. This perquisite includes access to certain files, devices, 
etc. 
• All attacks lead to the acquisition of some previously unheld ability. 
The limitation of such approach is it cannot detect attacks focus on the manipu-
lation of components outside the system's execution domain, such as physical attack, 
etc. Also, it can only protect illegal disclosure or modification of data. Other kind of 
attack that beach the security of the system, like the denial of service attack, is not 
within the consideration of such approach [55 . 
Colored Petri Nets 
Another state-transition approach is using Colored Petri (CP)-Nets developed by Sandeep 
Kumar and Gene Spafford [56] [57] [58]. They use modified CP-Nets to represent and 
detect intrusion patterns. 
Figure 4.2 shows a sample of such signature. The circles represent states and the 
thick bars represent the transitions. There are at least one initial state and exactly 
one final state. Initially, a token is placed in each initial state. Afterward, each state 
29 
Chapter 4 A Survey on Intrusion Detection System 
Initial State states Final State 
i I I k ‘ ‘ 
Transitions 
Figure 4.2: An CP-Net Signature 
can contain an '^arbitrary number of token as token flows from one state to another. 
This arbitrary distribution is called marking. 
The net has associated with a set of variables. Different from CP-nets, the variables 
here are globally visible to the pattern. Each token maintains its own local copy of 
these variables. Thus it can make its own "bindings" as it move to the final state. 
The color of each token can be thought as an n-tuple of strings, where the pattern has 
n variables. 
Each transition has associated an event type as a condition for it to fire, called 
label. Each transition can also associate guards, which is optional, to it. Guards are 
boolean expressions for variable testing and assignment, which can be used as pattern 
matching and performing post-actions. A transition is said to be fired when it satisfies 
three conditions: (1) the input states contain at least one token, (2) the event type 
occurred is the same as the label, and (3) the guards return true. When a transition 
is fired, all the input token are merged into one token and then copies of these unified 
token would be put to each output states of the transition. 
A signature is said to be match if the token move from the initial state to the final 
state. 
It may seem that this approach is the same as the state transition analysis de-
scribed in the section before, but there are significant differences between these two 
approaches [47]: 
• In state transition analysis, an intrusion is detected by the effect on the sys-
tem state, which is the outcome of the intrusion. While in CP-Nets approach, 
intrusion is detected by pattern matching the attack signature. 
• In state transition analysis guards are placed in the state, while in CP-Nets 
guards are placed in the transition. 
The IDIOT system [57] [59] [60] [58] [56] use this method to do intrusion detection. 
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4.3.2 Threshold Detection 
As its name implies, it detect for the number of occurrence of some certain events. 
If the number of occurrence exceeds a pre-defined threshold value over a fixed period 
of time, the system will signal the SSO for such event. The classic example for such 
detection is the number of fail login. If the number of fail login exceeds a certain 
number, an intrusion is said to be found. 
It is simple as you can see, but it is difficult to fine-tune the parameter. The 
threshold value is difficult to set. Setting too low will identify an legitimate action as 
an attack 一 false positive. Setting too high will miss some possible attack 一 false 
negative. And there is no definite threshold value. The value can be vary from site to 
site. 
4.3.3 Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis detection method is used in the anomaly detection approach. 
It use the statistical method to find out the deviations between pre-recorded profiles 
and the current audit data. If the deviations is large, then possible intrusion is said 
to be found. 
Just like any anomaly detection system, the statistical analysis also requires a 
profile for normal activities. A profile here keeps statistics such as frequency tables, 
means and covariances, rather than keep all the historical audit data. A profile can 
be against a user, a workstation, a network of workstations, a remote host, a group of 
users, etc. 
The profile also need to keep updating from time to time. Before updating, the 
stored data in each profile can be first aged by multiplying them by an exponential 
decay factor before the new data is added. This method can make the profile kept the 
most up-to-date statistical data while still keeping some historical data. 
IDES [61] [62] from SRI use statistical analysis for the intrusion detection. Here we 
will briefly describe the algorithm below as an example of statistical analysis. IDES 
uses multivariate methods to profile the normal behavior and identify deviations from 
the expected behavior. The audited activities in IDES are described by a vector of 
intrusion-detection variables, corresponding to the measures recorded in the profiles. 
The measure, label as S, represent some aspect of behaviors, such as recent file access, 
CPU time unused, etc. A statistic test value, named as IDES score value or IS in short, 
is calculated from this measures to form a summary judgment of the abnormality. 
Suppose there are n measures, 1 < i < n, and Cik denotes the correlation between 
Si and Sk- The formula of IS is: 
IS = {Si,S2i …，5^2,…，SnY 
where is the inverse of the correlation matrix of the vector (5i, 52 , . . . , and 
(5i, 52 , . . . , SnY is the transpose of that vector. If all the measurement is independent, 
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the correlation matrix would become an identity matrix, the IS value becomes Sf + 
S2 + . . . + S^. 
4.3.4 Neural Network 
The artificial neural network (ANN) is an computational tools that is similar to our 
brains. Inside our brains, there are a lot of neurons joined together to form a network. 
The strength of connections among neurons are different and will change over time. 
It is believed that our knowledges is encoded inside these connections. 
The ANN is designed to work similar to our brain. It is hope that ANN can 
"think". ANN also consists of a number of simple processing elements called units. 
These units are connected by weighted connections to form network. ANN "learns" 
by changing weights in the weighted connections. 
Most ANN need to undergo a "learning" process before they can work. Just like 
we human beings need to learn. The learning process is done by feeding inputs and 
expected outputs to the network. From the difference between the outputs from the 
network and the expected outputs, weights in connections are changed to make the 
network's outputs draw nearer to the expected outputs. After the outputs from the 
network is nearly the same as the expected output, ANN is said to complete the 
"learning" process and can work. 
ANN can be used in IDS in various way, below is some examples: 
Anomaly Detection in general The ANN can be used to learn user behavior and 
then to determine whether it is anomaly or not. This approach seems better than 
statistical approach for anomaly detection (refer to section 4.3.3). In statistical 
approach, we need to first model the user behavior into a set of features. Then 
used these fixed set of features to analysis for anomaly. These kind of assumption 
is not a requirement in the ANN. 
Command predications The ANN can be used to predict the next possible com-
mand a user may enter from previous commands [63] [64]. If the user enters 
a command different from the ANN predicts, anomaly is detected. The ANN 
learns the user behavior from sequences of user command inputs. By using 
a shift window in the sequence, the ANN learns the next command given the 
previous n commands inputed. 
Keyword Selection ANN can be used to determine the attack probability and at-
tack classification given the counts of a set of keywords [65]. The system has 
a predefined list of keywords that detect suspicious actions and known attacks. 
Prom the sniffed data, the system count the number of the keyword occurrence. 
The data of keyword occurrences is then input to the ANN to determine the 
probability of a true attack and classify the attack. 
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4.3.5 Artificial Immune System 
The idea of the artificial immune system is quite similar to the artificial neural network. 
Both of them use computer components to imitate the humans internal mechanisms. 
The artificial neural network imitates the human brain while the artificial immune 
system imitates the human defense mechanism. 
In the natural immune system, it differentiates materials in our body into self and 
nonself. Self means the internal cells, molecules naturally inside our body; nonself 
means the foreign materials, like viruses, foreign bacteria, parasites. Once differentiate 
out nonself, the natural immune system eliminates them. This task is quite difficult. 
Sometimes, the natural immune system would differentiate wrongly. The autoimmune 
diseases is the result of confusion between self and nonself by the natural immune 
system. 
The mechanism of self-nonself discrimination in the natural immune system can 
also be used in computer systems. That is, we try to differentiate between legitimate 
users, actions, etc (self) and unauthorized users, viruses, etc (nonself) in a natural 
immune system approach. 
One of the artificial immune system is purposed by Forrest et al. [66]. The al-
gorithm is divided into two phrases. The first phrase is the generation of detectors. 
The second phrase the comparison between the generated detectors and the protected 
data. 
• Phase 1 is for generations of detectors. A detector is a string that does not 
match any of the "self strings. The method of generation is randomly select 
a string and then compare it to the self strings. If a match is find, then the 
randomly generated string is dropped. Otherwise, the generated string is kept 
as a detector. 
• Phrase 2 is for the actual detection. The generated detectors in phrase 1 is used 
to compare with the protected data. If a match is found, that means nonself is 
found. 
Note that the match above does not mean a prefect match. It means r contiguous 
matches between the two comparing strings in the corresponding positions. 
There are some faster methods purposed by Patrick D'Haeselleer. For details can 
refer to [67]. 
4.3.6 Data Mining 
The data mining is refer to the process of extracting models from a large amount 
of data [68]. The data mining techniques can be used in the intrusion detection to 
discover useful patterns of system features describing user and program behaviors. It 
can also be used to classify anomalies and known intrusions from patterns of features. 
There are many data mining algorithms available. However, for the intrusion 
detection, the following three are most useful [69] [70] [71]: 
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Classification The classification algorithm maps a data item into one of the several 
predefined categories. It is used in intrusion detection system to classify normal 
and particular kinds of intrusions. To use it, we need to first fit sufficient "nor-
mal" and "intrusion" data into the algorithm to learn a classifier. The classifier 
can then be used to determine the future data as normal or intrusions. 
Link analysis The link analysis algorithm determines relations between fields in the 
database records. The result of the link analysis algorithm is the association 
rules in the records. It is used in the intrusion detection system to find out the 
correlations between system features and audit data. The user profile for the 
anomaly detection can use this algorithm to develop. 
Sequence analysis The sequence analysis algorithm models sequential patterns. The 
result of the sequence analysis algorithm is the frequent episodes of audit record 
patterns. In the intrusion detection system, it can be used to find out which 
events are typically appear together. The temporal and statistical measures can 
use this algorithm to find out. 
However, there are some problems when using data mining techniques in IDS [72]: 
Accuracy For an IDS using data mining techniques, the false alarm rate is usually 
much higher than the signature-based IDS. As you will see in section 4.6.1, the 
false alarm rate is one of the obstacles for the intrusion detection system. 
Efficiency For data mining, there are high computational usage during training 
and evaluation processes. Such high computation expense prevent data-mining-
based IDS from being used in the real time detections. 
Usability As for data mining, it requires a large amount of data to extract models. 
The requirements of such large amount of data make it more complex than other 
IDS. 
4.3.7 Traffic Analysis 
It is a kind of anomaly detection scheme. It first build a profile of normal network 
resources usage and then compare the profile with the current usage patterns for 
possible attacks. It does not look into the data of each packet pass through. Rather, 
it just look at how many and how large of them out there at a given period of time. 
The Network Security Monitor (N.S.M.) [73] [12] uses such scheme to detect pos-
sible intrusion. N.S.M. is developed at the University of California, David. It is the 
first system directly use network traffic as a source for intrusion detection. It passively 
listens to the traffic in the LAN to detect for possible intrusions. 
The N.S.M. would first parse the network traffic into a hierarchically-structured 
Interconnected Computing Environment Model (ICEM). Together with the profiles of 
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the expected traffic, the know attack signatures, etc, to detect the suspicion level of a 
particular connection. 
Details of ICEM structure can refer to [12]. It consists of six layers. The lowest 
layer is the bit stream on the network, while the highest layer is the representation of 
the state for the entire network. 
The traffic is then analyzed by an expert system to determine whether a particular 
connection is an attack or the host is compromised. 
4.4 False Alarm Rate 
There are two types of result from IDS, a positive result and a negative result. A 
positive result means IDS detect an intrusion, while a negative result means a non-
intrusion. 
IDS can sometimes detect wrongly 一 a false result. Thus, the result of IDS can be 
categorize into four cases, a true positive, a true negative, a false positive and a false 
negative. A true positive means an IDS detects an intrusion and actually it is. A true 
negative means an IDS detects nothing suspicious an actually it is. A false positive 
means an IDS detects an intrusion but actually is not. A false negative means an IDS 
detects nothing suspicious but actually there is an intrusion. 
The false alarm rate means the probabilities for an IDS from getting an false 
positive. A detail description of the impact of high false alarm rate on IDS can refer 
to section 4.6.1. 
4.5 Response 
IDS can automatically respond to an suspected intrusion or they can just report to 
the SSO what had happened. The automatic response from IDS includes stopping 
the suspected packets, notifying firewall to block all the incoming traffics from that 
particular hosts, terminating the session, etc. Of course, IDS with automatic response 
feature still need to inform SSO on what action it had taken. 
Some may think that stopping all the suspected packets automatically is the best 
solution. However, that is not always true. I use the word "suspected" here because 
IDS can make wrong decision. The suspected intrusion may actually no harm. In this 
case, automatically blocking suspected packets can cause legitimate users unable to 
use the system. 
On the other hand, just reporting to the SSO for suspected intrusion definitely 
would not interfere the legitimate users from using the system. However, damage can 
be made to the system and SSO can do little to prevent it from happening. 
There is no definite answer on what responses is better then the others. One way 
to choose what actions IDS should take is too look at what type of intrusion it detects. 
For some type of intrusion, the false alarm rate is low. Then SSO can consider to set 
the IDS automatically block the suspected packets. For some type of intrusion, the 
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false alarm rate is high. Then SSO can consider to set the IDS to just report to him 
for further actions. 
4.6 Difficulties in IDS 
4.6.1 Base Rate Fallacy 
One of the difficulty in the IDS is the false alarm rate. Even if the false alarm rate 
is quite low, say 1%, the probability of the suspected packet actually with intrusion 
is much less than 99% given a very low base rate [74]. Let's take an example to 
illustrate [74]. 
Suppose there is an disease in the world that only a very few percent, 0.01%, of 
people catch it. During a test, your doctor told you you have catch it. Your doctor 
tell you that the test is very accurate. For a group of people with all of them have 
the disease, the test result is 99% accurate. Similarly, for a group of people with all 
of them do not have the disease, the test result is also 99% accurate. Then you may 
think that the probability of you having the disease given the positive result from the 
test is very high. However, it is not true. 
Consider the following Bayes' theorem, 
拟 岡 = 拟 ) 華 ) (4-1) 
Now, let P denotes a positive outcome. Let S denotes the event of sickness. Now 
re-writing the equations in 4.1 with P and S, the equations becomes: 
P) — P(S)'P(m (4.2) 
)—P(S). P(P|5) + . 卜SO ^ 丨 
Now, P{S) = 0.0001, P(P|5) = 0.99 and 卜幻 = 1 — P^PhS) = 1 - 0.99 
0.01. Substitute all these values into equation 4.2: 
P ( 5 P) = 0 屋 . 0 . 9 9 = 0.00980 … a 1% (4.3) 
^ ) 0.0001 • 0.99+ 0.01 
The result is quite shocking. Even if the test is 99% accurate, you actually have 
only about 1% probability getting the disease given the positive result from the test. 
This phenomenon is named as "the base-rate fallacy", for humans in general do not 
take accounts in the basic rate of incidence, the basic rate, during intuitively thinking. 
The same situation of the above examples can occur in IDS. If we assume that the 
probability of getting an attack in general is very low. Then even if the false alarm 
rate of IDS is very very low, the probability of actually getting an intrusion given a 
positive result from IDS is still very low. 
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4.6.2 Denial of Service Attack against IDS 
Squeal attack in Network Signature-Based IDS 
The squeal attack [75] exploits the high false alarm rate in the network signature-
based IDS [76] [77]. The attack is against a signature-based IDS "SNORT" [78], but 
the authors argues that it is theoretically possible for the attack to against other IDS. 
The attack is based on the recreation of packets from the attack signature used in 
SNORT. 
The recreation of packets from the attack signature can produce a lot of false 
positive with varying source address and signature patterns packets. The packets can 
cause the IDS with a lot of false alarms. With a lot of alarms shown in the IDS, the 
SSO can no longer differentiate whether the alarms is real or not. Attacker can use 
this technique to divert the attention from the real attack to the noise. 
Attack against Fail-Open Network-Based IDS 
For most network-based IDS, it is inherently "fail-open". The term fail-open means 
when the IDS stops functioning, the network is still available. Its opposite is "fail-
closed", meaning when IDS crash, the network is completely inaccessible. We say 
NIDS is inherently fail-open because most of them are passive. They do not have 
control on any network equipments. When the network-based IDS suffer from DOS 
attack and crash, the fail-open property making hackers can launch the actual attack 
undetected [79]. Many techniques in the section 3.3.1 can be used to against IDS. 
4.6.3 Insertion and Evasion attack against the Network-Based IDS 
Although there is a standard of the packets format, but different system could handle 
it differently when the packet is malformat. Some system can accept it but some other 
would just drop it. This kind of behavior lead to the following attacks [79: • 
Insertion An IDS can accept a packet that the end system rejects. The data in 
packets, which is accepted by the IDS but rejected by the end system, is then 
successfully "inserted" into the IDS. This kind of attack is called the insertion 
attack. The inserted data can be used to defeat signature analysis. For exam-
ple, suppose the IDS can detect for strings "intrusion" from the packets. The 
attackers can bypass this by first fragment the string "intrusion" into several 
packets. Then "insert" a packet which contain the data "xxx". The IDS can see 
the string as intxxxrusion, but the end system would see "intrusion". The IDS 
fail to detect it. . 
Evasion An IDS can reject a packet that the end system accepts. The data in 
packets, which is rejected by the IDS but accepted by the end system, is then 
successfully ”evaded” from the IDS. This kind of attack is called the evasion 
attack. Similarly, this attack can be used to defeat signature analysis in IDS. 
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Instead of inserting data to IDS, evasion attack erase the data from IDS to make 
it fail to get a match from the signatures. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This section briefly describes the current intrusion detection technologies, from data 
collection, processing to response. It also describes the current down side in the IDS. 





Intrusion Detection using Mobile 
Agents 
5.1 Introduction 
We can also categorize an IDS between the centralized systems and the distributed 
systems. DIDS is in general better than centralized counterparts. Detailed compar-
isons can be found in section 2.4.3. However, there is a problem in many DIDS — 
they cannot block packets immediately when an intrusion is detected. The detection 
systems usually only report to the SSO what have happened, but they cannot pre-
vent the damage on the target machine. Some of the DIDS [80] can terminate the 
session of attacks. However, its action may be too late to prevent the damage in time. 
Our paper addresses exactly the problem of timely prevention of the damage. In our 
proposed model, we try to make the IDS preemptive in a distributed manner. 
Our system makes use of both static and mobile agents as building blocks. Many 
DIDS, or IDS in general, apply agent systems in their architecture [16] [81] [82] [83 . 
Agents with different functionalities can collaborate together to detect intrusion effi-
ciently. In addition, mobile agents can be used to achieve load balancing. 
To the best knowledge of these authors, we cannot find any literatures on simul-
taneously distributed and preemptive IDS. However, we have found one preemptive 
IDS architecture [84] can be made to be distributed though that authors have not 
mentioned so explicitly. We note their system requires the rewriting of applications 
in order to support the detection, which is not a requirement in our system. 
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Figure 5.1: Architecture Design 
5.2 Architecture Design 
5.2.1 Overview 
The proposed model is a network-based preemptive distributed intrusion detection 
system using mobile agents. Packets are diverted to various types of agents strategi-
cally placed around the network. Various agents perform tasks in control, detection, 
policy, and blocking. Suspected packets are blocked before they reach the destination 
when an intrusion is detected and the policy mechanism verdicts for blockage. 
There are five types of agents in our architecture; they are the gateway agent, the 
controller agent, the detection agent, the policy agent, and the home agent. Within 
these five types of agents, only the controller agent is mobile. Other types of agents 
are all static. Below are detailed descriptions. 
5.2.2 Agents involved 
Gateway agent 
A gateway agent is an agent that resides in the gateway between the internal network 
and the external network (see Figure 5.1). It is responsible for grabbing packets from 
the external network and sending them to one of the controller agents in the internal 
network for the intrusion detection. 
The decision to send a particular packet to which controller agent depends on 
(1) the workload of the host computer where the controller agent resides, (2) the 
session which the packet belongs to, and (3) the cluster which the controller agent is 
involved. When the workload of the host computer where the controller agent resides 
is too high, the controller agent would notify the gateway agents and the home agents 
not to send any more packets to it for detection. In this way, we can make sure that 
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the intrusion detection would not interfere the normal work on the host computer. 
Note that there is a priority of sending packets to the controller agent in the packet's 
destination host to reduce the unnecessary traffic and latency. For efficiency, packets 
belonging to the same session would be sent to the same controller agent. In order 
to detect distributed intrusions, several controller agents would join together to form 
a cluster for the information exchanges. The clustering of controller agents will be 
further discussed in section 5.2.3. 
Controller agent 
A controller agent is an agent residing in computers in the internal network (see Figure 
5.1). It receives packets either from the home agents (outgoing/internal traffic) or 
the gateway agents (incoming traffic). Then it transfers the received packets to the 
detection agents for the intrusion detection. Afterward, it sends the packet together 
with the result from the detection agents to the home agent (incoming/internal traffic) 
in the packet's destination host or to the gateway agent (outgoing traffic). 
The controller agent is a mobile agent. When the host is overloaded, the controller 
agent will move to other host to continue its detection work. At the same time, it 
will notify the gateway agents and the home agents not to send any more packets of 
new sessions to it for detection. However, it still continues the intrusion detection for 
the packets in the sessions previously under detection. By the time the original host 
is not overloaded anymore, it will migrate back to the original host and notify the 
gateway agents and the home agents that the detection is resumed. 
Detection agent 
A detection agent is an agent responsible for the actual intrusion detection job (see 
Figure 5.1). Each controller agent controls a number of detection agents. Each de-
tection agent is only responsible for detecting certain types of intrusions. This makes 
it easier for updating when new types of intrusion is found or new types of detection 
method is invented. The detection agents get the packet from the controller agent and 
the information from the leader controller agents (Refer to section 5.2.3) in the cluster. 
Then, they determine whether the packet is an intrusion or not and estimate the false 
alarm rate. The exact algorithm for the false alarm rate estimation is the subject of 
active research [85] [86]. After the decision is made, it reports to the controller agent. 
Home agent 
A home agent is an agent responsible for receiving (incoming) packets from and sending 
(outgoing) packets to the controller agent (see Figure 5.1). When it receives the packet 
and the detection result from the controller agent, it consults the policy agent on what 
action it should take. If the policy agent verdicts for non-blockage, the packet will be 
passed to the corresponding process in the host computer. When a certain process 
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needs to send packets to outside, either to the host in the external network or in the 
internal network, the home agent redirects them to the controller agent for detection 
instead of sending them out directly. The criteria of sending the packets to which 
controller agent is similar to the criteria in the gateway agent (see section 5.2.2). 
Policy agent 
A policy agent is an agent responsible for what action a home agent or a gateway 
agent should take when an intrusion is found (see Figure 5.1). Possible actions include 
dropping the packet, block all the packets from that source address, letting the packet 
pass through but informing the SSO, just logging the event down without informing 
the SSO, etc. 
It should not block all packets that are suspected of an intrusion. Since false alarm 
rate in many detection systems are still high[74], blocking all suspected packets could 
cause many non-intrusion packets to be discarded. Thus we should only block/discard 
those packets that we are nearly sure they are damaging to the destination host. The 
policy agent's function is exactly to determine what actions the home agent should 
take on the packet at hand given the estimated false alarm rate by the detection agent. 
The policy in policy agent can different from host to host. For example, for a 
machine contains highly classified data, SSO may want to set its policy agent to block 
all the packets whenever possible. 
For some actions, a home agent or a gateway agent cannot do it alone. The home 
agent or the gateway agent will be responsible to notify the corresponding agents 
the decision of the policy agent. Consider the action of blocking all packets from the 
suspected packet's source address, the home agent or the gateway agent cannot handle 
it alone. It will be responsible to notify the leader controller agent of the particular 
source address about the decision from the policy agent. 
5.2.3 Clustering 
In order to detect the distributed intrusion, several controller agents form a cluster. 
Within the cluster, controller agents can share information to detect the distributed 
intrusion, such as port scanning over the whole network, etc. 
A cluster is formed among controller agents that detect packets with "similar 
header". The packets with "similar header" means the packets have the same desti-
nation address, the same destination port, the same source address or the same source 
port (see Table 5.1). 
Since one controller agent can be involved in detecting packets from different ad-
dresses, ports, etc, a controller agent can be in more than one cluster. Inside the 
cluster, the controller agents elect a leader {leader controller agent). All the con-
troller agents have to report to the leader. Then, the leader processes the data and 
then sends the result to the "members" {member controller agents) in the cluster. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates an example on how a controller agent involves in clusters. 
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Source Source Dest. Dest. Action 
IP Port IP Port 
Same Same Same | Same Detection under 
the same agent 
Same Di f f~ Same Same Detection under 
the same cluster 
Same A n y S a m e Diff Detection under 
the same cluster 
Same A n y D i f f Same Detection under 
the same cluster 
Same Any Diff Diff Detection under 
the same cluster 
Diff Any~ Same Same Detection under 
the same cluster 
Diff Any Same Diff Detection under 
the same cluster 
Diff Any Diff Same Detection under 
the same cluster 
~Di f f Any Diff D i f fDetec t i on under 
the same cluster 
Table 5.1: Cluster formation criteria 
Leader of Leader of 
src: 137.189.1;l:any src: 137.189.1.1 
dst 137.189.10.1:ai^ dst: 137.189.10.1:80 
Conlrollei agent Controller agent Controller ag&nt 
Inspecting packet Inspecting packet Inspectingpacket: 
Src-137.189.1.1:12345 Src: 137.189.1.1:23346 Src: 137.189.1.1:5645 
Dst 137.189.10.1:80 Dst 137.189.10.1:80 Dst 137.189.10.1:23 
Figure 5.2: Clustering example 
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Figure 5.3: Operation when the home agent and the controller agent are in the same 
host 
For example, to detect port scanning against the whole subnet, the cluster with 
the same source address but different destination address and port can be used (see 
table 5.1 row 6). The member controller agents inside the cluster detect port scanning 
activities from a host and they report to the leader controller agent. The rate of port 
scanning on each of the machine is very low so that the policy agent decide not to block 
it. However, the leader controller agent finds out that the port scanning activities come 
from the same source address. Thus, it notify the member controller agents that it 
is a distributed port scanning activities. The member controller agents in turns send 
this information to individual policy agent and let them to decide whether to block it 
or not. 
If gateway agents or home agents just randomly pick up a controller agent for an 
intrusion detection, many controller agents could be involved in detecting a particular 
address or port. Thus, the cluster size would become very large. The efficiency 
decrease as a result because the leader controller agent needs to communicate to a large 
number of member controller agents. In order to improve efficiency, the gateway agent 
would send the packet to the controller agent already inside the cluster if possible. 
5.3 How it works 
Scenario 1 The home agent and the controller agent are in the same host (Figure 5.3) 
The gateway agent grabs packets from the external network. At this moment, 
the packet's destination host is lightly loaded and is possible to do the intrusion 
detection. Thus, the gateway agent sends the packet to the controller agent in 
the packet's destination host. The controller agent makes use of the detection 
agents for the intrusion detection. Finally, the controller agent sends the packet 
together with the detection result to the home agent in the same host. The 
home agent then consults the policy agent on what actions it should take. If the 
policy agent verdicts for non-blockage, the home agent will send the packet to 
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Figure 5.4: Operation when the home agent and the controller agent are in different 
hosts 
the corresponding process. In this way, it prevents unnecessary network traffic. 
Scenario 2 The home agent and the controller agent are in different host (Figure 5.4) 
The gateway agent grabs packets from the external network. Instead of sending 
the packet directly to the destination host, it sends the packet to the controller 
agent located in a different host for an intrusion detection. This happens when 
the packet's destination host heavily loaded and is not possible to do the in-
trusion detection. Similar to scenario 1，the controller agent does the detection 
job using the detection agents. Finally, the controller agent sends the packet 
together with the detection result to the home agent in the packet's destination 
host. The home agent then consults the policy agent on what action it should 
take. If the policy agent verdicts for non-blockage, the home agent will send the 
packet to the corresponding process. 
Scenario 3 Operation when the internal host send packets to the host in the external 
network (Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6) 
The home agent grabs packets from the process in the same host. Instead 
of sending the packet directly to the destination host, it sends the packet to 
the controller agent for an intrusion detection. Sending the packet to the con-
troller agent located at the packet's source host or in a different host depends 
on whether the source host is heavily loaded. Similar to scenario 1 & 2, when 
the source host is heavily loaded, the packet is sent to the controller agent in a 
different host. If not, the packet is sent to the controller agent in the same host. 
The controller agent then does the detection job using the detection agents. Fi-
nally, the controller agent sends the packet together with the detection result to 
the gateway agent. The gateway agent then consults the policy agent on what 
45 
Chapter 5 Preemptive Distributed Intrusion Detection using Mobile Agents 
V/vV 
^ External > • ^ ^ V 广 
Network \ agent / \ / Detection \ 
( p - y 、 \ 
V agpnt / Y Detection � 
* ‘ 
Figure 5.5: Operation when the internal host send packets to the host in the external 
network and the home agent and the controller agent are in the same hosts 
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Figure 5.6: Operation when the internal host send packets to the host in the external 
network and the home agent and the controller agent are in different hosts 
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Figure 5.7: Operation when hosts sending packets internally using the controller agent 
in packet's source host 
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Figure 5.8: Operation when hosts sending packets internally using the controller agent 
in packet's destination host 
action it should take. If the policy agent verdicts for non-blockage, the gateway 
agent will send the packet to the corresponding address in external network. 
Scenario 4 Operation when hosts sending packets internally (Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8 
and Figure 5.9) 
The home agent grabs packets from the process in the same host. Instead of 
sending the packet directly to the destination host, it sends the packet to the 
controller agent for an intrusion detection. There are now three options of 
sending the packet to which controller agent, they are the controller agent in 
the packet's source host, in the packet's destination host, and in the other hosts. 
There is a priority of sending the packet to the controller agent in the packet's 
source or destination host if they are lightly loaded. The controller agent then 
does the detection job using the detection agents. Finally, the controller agent 
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Figure 5.9: Operation when hosts sending packets internally using the controller agent 
in other host 
sends the packet together with the detection result to the home agent in the 
packet's destination host. The home agent then consults the policy agent on 
what action it should take. If the policy agent verdicts for non-blockage, the 
home agent will send the packet to the corresponding process. 
5.3.1 Pseudo codes of operations 
The pseudo code for the gateway agent to determine sending the packet to which 
controller agent. 
if the packet is in the session previously under detection, then 
send the packet to the same controller agent as previously. 
else 
check the loading in the packet,s destination host 
if the loading is light, then 
send the packet to the controller agent in the packet‘s 
destination host 
else 
send the packet to the other controller agent 
end 
end 
The pseudo code for the home agent to determine sending the packet to which 
controller agent. 
if the packet is in the session previously under detection, then 
send the packet to the same controller agent as previously 
else 
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check the loading in packet‘s source host 
if the loading is light, then 
send the packet to the controller agent in the packet‘s source host 
else 
if the packet is destinate to a host in external network, then 
send the packet to other controller agent 
else 
check the loading in the packet‘s destination host 
if the loading is light, then 
send the packet to the controller agent in the packet ^  s 
destination host 
else 






Minimize the impact on the host machine An intrusion detection should not 
interfere the normal work in the host. IDS is to keep the security of com-
puter system. It should not affect the availability of the system, which is one of 
the factors in computer security [10]. Our system minimizes the impact by only 
doing the detection on lightly loaded machines whenever possible. 
Preemptive IDS has long been criticized for just reporting instead of stopping an 
intrusion in a timely fashion. In our design, if an intrusion is found and the 
policy agent verdicts for blockage, those suspected packets can be discarded 
before reaching the process in the destination host. 
5.5 Drawbacks & Possible Solutions 
There are already some intrusion detection systems using mobile agent technologies 
for detection. One of the advantages of such systems is on the reduction of network 
traffic [87]. However, in our design, this advantage is no longer true 一 the amount of 
network traffic is actually increased. Because the packets need to visit the controller 
agent first before they reach the destination host, the traffic is nearly doubled. 
There are several ways to help alleviate the problem. 
Method 1 When the packet's destination host is lightly loaded, the detection can be 
done on that host (see section 5.3 scenario 1). In this way, the network traffic 
would not be increased. 
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Figure 5.10: Multicasting to both the controller agent and the home agent 
Method 2 Multicasting can also help alleviate the problem. Refer to figure 5.10, 
when the gateway agent gets the packet, it will not send to the controller agent 
alone. It will multicast to both the controller agent and the home agent. After 
the home agent receives the packet, it would hold the packet until the controller 
agent notifies it. By using multicasting, the network traffic would not increase 
that much. However, the home agent needs a large space to store pending 
packets. 
Another problem to our system is network latency. By finishing the intrusion 
detection before the packet reached the destination, our system introduces a certain 
amount of latency. We are in the opinion that the latency is a necessary evil of the 
preemptive IDS such as our scheme and those scheme in [84 . 
5.6 Other Possible Mode of Operation 
One of the greatest problems in the intrusion detection system nowadays is the high 
false alarm rate [74]. A solution is the mass parallel processing architecture [88 . 
Our model can also adapt to this kind of operation. Instead of multicasting to one 
controller agent and the home agent (see section 5.5 method 2), the gateway agent will 
multicast to a number of controller agents with different types of detection agents (see 
figure 5.11). Then the controller agents notify the home agent about their results. The 
home agent and the policy agent will distinguish the packet whether it is an intrusion 
or not based on all the results from different controller agents. 
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Figure 5.11: Parallel operation 
5.7 Conclusion 
Our system is an attempt to design a distributed intrusion detection system with 
preemptive functionality. Apart from its preemptive functionality, it can also help 
reduce the impact on the host machines of the intrusion detection workload. Yet, 
there is a trade-off. More traffic inside the internal network is introduced. However, 




This thesis is focus on one of the drawbacks in the distributed intrusion detection 
system 一 its passive nature. Most of the distributed intrusion detection systems are 
just passively placed inside the network to detect intrusions. Even if the intrusion 
detection system detects an intrusion, there is little things the system can do. Its 
actions is too late to prevent the damage in time. We have proposed a preemptive 
distributed intrusion detection system using mobile agents to tackle this problem. 
To start with, we present the increasing threats in the current network environ-
ment. The intrusion detection systems is therefore needed for the current situation. 
We then present different categorization methods of intrusion detection systems to 
serve as a brief introduction of them. 
However, without the knowledge of how attackers attack, little things we can do 
to protect our system. Therefore we present some attack techniques that are generally 
used by the attackers. 
With the knowledge of attack methods, we present a survey on intrusion detection 
system. An intrusion detection system can be divided into three parts, they are data 
monitoring, data analysis and intrusion response. We present the techniques used in 
these three parts and some problems associated with the current intrusion detection 
system. 
Intrusion detection systems have long been criticized of just reporting instead of 
stopping intrusions. That is especially true in distributed intrusion detection system. 
To tackle this problem, we purpose a preemptive distributed intrusion detection sys-
tem. The system works by diverting the packets to different agents inside the internal 
network. When an intrusion is found, the agents is capable of blocking the packets 
from doing damage to the target host. 
Our system makes use of both mobile and static agents as building blocks. There 
are five types of agents in our system, the gateway agent, the controller agent, the 
home agent, the detection agent and the policy agent. They responsible for incoming 
packet controls, detection controls, detection, policy advice and policy enforcement 
and outgoing packet controls. Because the detection is done before the packets reach 
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to the processes in the target host, the suspected packet can be preempted. Apart 
from its preemptive functionality, the workload of intrusion detection is distributed 
over the network and so the impact can be minimal. 
It is not a perfect solution to the problem though. As a tradeoff to the preemptive 
functionality, the network traffic and latency is increased. To tackle this, we have 
purposed some solutions to alleviate the problem. 
The intrusion detection system is only about twenty years old. The evolution of 
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